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Abstract 
In this paper we try to explore the relationship between the World Bank’s 
international development assistance (IDA) and domestic conflict. As IDA is 
distributed only to countries that fall below an (ad hoc) income threshold, we employ 
a (fuzzy) regression discontinuity approach to estimate the causal effect of IDA on 
conflict. Our results suggest that IDA leads to a decrease in minor conflict events, 
such as anti-government demonstrations and riots and in an increase in major conflict 
events like assassinations of political leaders and revolutions. Moreover, IDA is 
associated with an increase in coup attempts and autocratic regime transitions. These 
results suggest that foreign aid may “win the hearts and minds of the population”, by 
increasing popular support for the government, and at the same time increase conflict 
over lootable aid rents. 
 
WORD COUNT: 10732  
 
Keywords: Foreign aid, conflict, regression discontinuity 
JEL Classification: F35, D74, O11  
 
Acknowledgments: We would like to thank Sascha O. Becker, Stamatia Ftergioti, Achilleas Vassilopoulos, 
Michalis Chletsos,Margarita Katsimi, Christos Kollias, Thomas Moutos and Nikos Mylonidis for their valuable 
comments and suggestions. We would also like to thank Jennifer Rontganger for proofreading. This research is 
co-financed by Greece and the European Union (European Social Fund-ESF) through the Operational Program 
«Human Resources Development, Education and Lifelong Learning» in the context of the project “Strengthening 
Human Resources Research Potential via Doctorate Research” (MIS-5000432), implemented by the State 
Scholarships Foundation (ΙΚΥ).  
  
 
 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
A voluminous literature analyzes the effect of foreign aid on the recipient economy 
(e.g., Easterly 2003; Djankov et al. 2008; Doucouliagos and Paldam 2008; Dreher and 
Lohmann 2015; Galiani et al. 2017, for example, examine the effect of aid on growth, whereas, 
Burnside and Dollar 2000; Bjørnskov 2010; Askarov and Doucouliagos 2015, examine the 
effect of aid on the institutional quality). In the present paper, we examine the effect of aid, 
and more specifically of the World Bank’s international development assistance (IDA), on 
domestic conflict in the recipient country. This issue has been examined in several other 
contributions (Collier and Hoeffler 2000, 2002; Crost et al. 2016; Bluhm et al. 2016 etc.) with 
contradicting findings. To our knowledge, however, this is the first paper that uses the (ad 
hoc) GNI thresholds that the World Bank employs to distribute aid among recipient countries 
as an identification strategy to estimate the effect of foreign development assistance on 
conflict. 
Our focus on IDA has several methodological advantages. First, by only examining 
the effect of IDA receipts, we eliminate a potential bias stemming from a possible correlation 
of the type of donor on the probability of conflict (see for example de Mesquita and Smith 
2007). In other words, when examining the effect of aid in general, including all donors, 
conflict might be affected by identity of donor. Second, IDA is distributed according to a 
simple, exogenous to the recipient country, rule. This implies that the allocation of this type 
of aid is based on specific criteria and not on other issues (such as political alliances).  
Specifically, countries that are eligible for IDA must fall below a GNI threshold level which 
is defined by the World Bank, which is revised every year. Then, countries that have a GNI 
lower than the threshold two years before IDA allocations are made are eligible for aid. 
However, this is not the only condition for IDA allocation. According to the World Bank, in 
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addition, to receive IDA, a country must be considered not to be creditworthy for IBRD 
borrowing (Galiani et al. 2017). However, the latter condition is based on confidential reports 
by the World Bank. Hence, we use a fuzzy regression discontinuity design (Fuzzy RDD) so as 
to exploit both the GNI cutoff rule of the IDA program and deal with the problem facing some 
countries, in which, though they are below the threshold, they do not receive IDA as they are 
considered creditworthy. 
By estimating a local Fuzzy RDD, we identify the effect of aid on conflict for countries 
which are just above and just below the cutoff. This allows us to examine the causal effect for 
countries that are similar, in general, but with the only difference being their eligibility for 
IDA.1 Fuzzy RDD addresses the issue of endogeneity which plagues the standard fixed effects 
OLS regressions (Lee and Lemieux 2010). Moreover, in contrast to matching techniques 
(Austin 2011) it does not depend on the assumption of conditional independence and overlap, 
which are only satisfied within the limit of an RDD framework (Heckman et al. 1999). 
The present paper contributes to the literature in another dimension as well. In contrast 
to the existing literature (e.g., Berthélemy 2006; Findley et al. 2010; Strange et al. 2017; Wood 
and Sullivan 2015) that examines the effect of aid on major conflict events, such as civil wars 
and revolutions, we examine the effect of aid on both major and minor conflict events.2 This 
strategy allows us to shed light on the underlying forces behind our main relationship. To 
further test our argument, we also exploit the Fuzzy RDD framework to examine the effect of 
IDA on coups and on autocratic regime change.  
Overall, our findings show that IDA receipt leads to an increased level of conflict. 
Moreover, we provide evidence that the effect of aid on conflict depends on the type of 
conflict. We find that IDA leads to a decline in minor conflict events (anti-government 
demonstrations, terrorism, riots, strikes) while it has a positive effect on major conflict events 
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(revolutions, assassinations of political leaders). These results are consistent with several 
theoretical contributions in the aid-conflict nexus. Since aid creates a “winning the hearts and 
minds” effect, i.e., improved economic performance makes people more inclined to be 
friendly toward the government and thus conflict is reduced (Collier and Hoeffler 2002), we 
find a negative effect of aid on low intensity events. Moreover, as aid creates rents for those 
that hold political power (Angeles and Neanidis 2009), we find a positive effect on high-level 
conflict events. This latter type of conflict can be considered as events that aim at changing 
the underlying power structure in a polity. Agents and groups that stand to gain from a change 
in the political regime, try to increase their political power, to expropriate the aid revenues. 
These findings are also accompanied by results that indicate, using the same Fuzzy RDD, that 
there is an increase in coups and autocratic regime transitions.  
In the following section we present the existing literature and then provide our main 
testable hypotheses. In section 4 we discuss our data and our empirical specification. In section 
5 we present our results while section 6 holds the robustness checks. Finally, section 7 
concludes. 
2. Literature Review  
A number of contributions have examined the effect of foreign aid on conflict, with 
contradicting findings. These findings vary depending on the sample used, the type of aid 
considered, and the empirical methodology employed. To explain these contradictory findings 
several theoretical arguments have been employed.  
Starting from Grossman (1992) and Azam (1995), aid revenues are modeled as 
lootable resources, and the fungibility of aid flows make them attractive to opposing groups 
for extraction (i.e., governments and rebels). What they show is that although governments 
may seek to deter rebellion by giving a share of the revenues to rebels, deterrence does not 
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always occur, as rebels might not like what the government is offering them, leading to an 
initiation of conflict. In a similar vein, Blattman and Miguel (2010), argue that there are some 
types of foreign aid flows that can be analogous to natural resources, thus governments and 
rebels want to capture them in order to finance their activities. This leads to an increased risk 
of civil war. Bó and Powell (2009), model the government and the opposition as competing 
over rents under uncertainty regarding the size of the spoils. They suggest that in bad times 
where a negative aid shock occurs, although that government may offer a part of the rents to 
the opposition, the opposition may feel “low-balled” and may prefer to engage in conflict. 
Narang (2015), provides evidence in favor of this view, by examining the effect of 
humanitarian aid using a world data set for the period 1969–2008, as he finds that increased 
levels of aid extend the duration of civil wars.3 
Against the “aid rents as lootable resources” argument comes the view that aid has an 
indirect effect on conflict by “winning the hearts and minds” of the population.4 In a field 
experiment on the effects of the National Solidarity Program on insurgency in Afghanistan, 
Beath et al. (2012) show that aid leads to lower insurgency violence because people treat as a 
positive all government attempts to improve their well-being and are thus less likely to join 
the insurgency. Crost et al. (2016), in a study that examines the effect of a conditional cash 
transfer (CCT)5 program on violent incidents in Philippines, show that the program increased 
popular support for the government. This, in turn, led to increased information sharing as well 
as cooperation between the government and the population regarding rebels’ activities. 
Similar findings are presented in Dasgupta et al. (2007), which show that when the level of 
state capacity is high, anti-poverty programs lead to a reduction in violence. This happens 
because with high levels of state capacity, there is a lack of corruption and the program funds 
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can more easily pass through to the local populations, which then makes people less willing 
to support an insurgency.6  
The “winning the heart and minds” view, however, may create second order effects, 
which increase conflict. Higher aid flows may increase economic growth, thus increasing 
popular support for the government. Rebels are not comfortable with this support and, fearing 
they will lose their clout, they thus sabotage foreign aid programs. Weintraub (2016) examines 
the effect of a CCT program in Colombia, using a difference-in-differences approach, with 57 
municipalities as treatments and 65 municipalities as controls. He finds that the program led 
to more killings and violent incidents. He suggests that this occurred as program beneficiaries 
cooperated with the government, and insurgents wanted to sabotage this cooperation. 
Similarly, Wood and Sullivan (2015), argue that aid will lead to an increased level of violence 
because it creates incentives for looting and also because it can be perceived by rebels as a 
challenge to their authority, which again leads to sabotage.  
Sexton (2016), using a similar logic, finds that the type of aid as well as the recipient 
area, play a key role on its effect on conflict in Afghanistan. He finds that aid programs which 
aimed at reducing conflict (by boosting military power, for example) lead to an increased level 
of conflict in contested areas, i.e., areas that are not controlled by the government. On the 
other hand, aid does not appear to have an effect on areas under the control of the military. 
The explanation given is that rebels have an incentive to sabotage the foreign aid programs so 
as not to lose their power.7,8  
Sollenberg (2012), in her empirical analysis for the period 1960–2004, finds that 
foreign aid increases the risk of conflict, conditional on the institutional environment of the 
recipient country. In a country with low levels of checks and balances, foreign aid inflows 
will lead to increased conflict due to rent-seeking activities. In contrast, she finds no effect 
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when there is a high level of checks and balances. She also finds that there is a threshold effect 
of aid on conflict, implying that the positive effect of aid on conflict arises after a point of aid 
revenues is reached.  
Finally, examining a particular type of aid, democracy assistance programs for 
countries that were eligible during the period 1990–2003, Savun and Tirone (2011), find that, 
via democracy assistance programs, countries improve their governance by providing an 
external validation of commitments and promises made during the transition. They identify a 
causal effect by estimating an instrumental variables model, using two instrumental variables 
which are: a) the donor’s GDP, and b) the level of the recipient country’s affinity with the 
United States. 
3. Theoretical considerations and testable hypotheses 
Following the literature highlighted in the previous section, we may conclude that aid 
can have a positive and negative effect on conflict. Since it is associated with an improvement 
in economic conditions and growth, it might increase the popular support for the government- 
i.e., winning the hearts and minds argument. On the other hand, having a large inflow of aid 
revenues creates incentives for those with political power to try to expropriate them. And this 
expropriation can only be achieved by a further increase in their relative political power. This, 
then, is the “aid rents as lootable” resources argument.  
Even though these two arguments predict a different effect of aid on conflict, they can 
coexist as they rest on different forces. Aid, by spurring economic growth, may increase 
popular support for the government. At the same time, the political elite may seek to 
expropriate the rents created by increased aid flows. Looking then at the overall level of the 
conflict, we may find conflicting results, with most studies finding a nonsignificant effect, and 
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studies that examine high-level conflict finding a positive effect (see, Doucouliagos 2019 for 
a survey). 
Even though the effect of aid on the overall level of conflict is ambiguous, all types of 
political instability do not respond in the same manner. For example, Regan and Norton (2016) 
highlight the distinction between conditions for low and high levels of conflict. For minor 
intensity conflict events, such as protests and riots, grievances are enough to mobilize the 
masses. Instead, for a higher level of conflict, i.e., revolutions, coups, civil war, etc., mass 
mobilization, with an associated private gain, is a necessary pre-condition. Participation in a 
violent event against the government or another group in the economy is subject to collective 
action problems (Olson 1965; Tullock 1971): it requires a high level of mobilization, involves 
a high private participation cost, and only produces group benefits. The higher the private cost 
of participating, the higher the required level of mobilization, and the lower the existence of 
private benefits, the less likely it is that individuals will participate in violent activities. 
Then, the distinction between minor and major conflict events becomes relevant. 
Minor conflict events, i.e., demonstrations, riots, or even some mild terrorist events, have a 
low cost of participation. Thus, these events can be initiated by “grievances” only (Regan and 
Norton 2005). According to the “winning the hearts and minds argument”, aid improves 
economic conditions, reducing the grievances. And, as long as the effects of this improvement 
are not dissipated only to a small subset of the ruling elite, we may formulate the following 
testable hypothesis 
H1: Foreign aid is expected to reduce minor intensity conflict events, such as strikes, 
peaceful demonstrations, and small-scale riots. 
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According to H1, winning the hearts and minds argument can be associated with 
changes in minor conflict events. If the economy performs well, typically it is attributed to the 
policies of the incumbent government. Hence, as distrust of the government falls, the general 
population will have no incentive to oppose the government and express their opposition with 
violent acts. 
The exact opposite holds for major conflict events. As aid is a lootable resource, it 
increases the total benefit for the ruling group, i.e., increases group expected benefits from 
conflict and inter-group conflict. And these opposing groups can be either rebels or the ruling 
elite, which will try to increase their power, vis-a-vis their opponents, and expropriate the aid-
rents. This higher intensity of between-group competition, then, gives additional incentives to 
elite and rebel group leaders to recruit individuals for their cause. At the same time, group 
leaders, by having greater expected resources, can more easily provide personalized benefits 
to the insurgents. Similarly, as group competition for resources increases, individuals may 
join a group to shield themselves from the repressive actions of the state or of competing 
groups.  
And even if greed is not the only source of conflict in the economy, there might be 
other channels that might create high-level conflict. The exclusion of certain groups from the 
rents created by foreign aid might be perceived by these groups as an exclusion from the 
state’s decision-making process (Walter 2009). Wealth discrimination then might spur 
political mobilization and struggle over better access to aid-created rents.9  
According to the arguments above, a second testable hypothesis is derived as:  
H2: Foreign aid is expected to increase high-intensity conflict events, such as 
revolutions, purges, and insurrections. 
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In the section that follows, we examine the effect of IDA on various types of conflict 
events so as to examine the validity of the above two hypotheses.  
4. Data and Identification 
The World Bank’s international development assistance (IDA) was launched in 
September 1960 as an agency with the goal to provide “soft loans” to the poorest developing 
countries. According to the World Bank (2010), IDA has grown to include 173 shareholder 
member countries and has given loans to 76 of the poorest countries in the world. IDA takes 
the form of long maturity loans, with a maturity of around 40 years, a large grace period, and 
a very low and fixed interest rate.10  
IDA eligibility among developing countries is based on two criteria, (i) relative 
poverty, defined as GNI per capita below an established threshold, and (ii) lack of 
creditworthiness to borrow on market terms. Until 1987 the threshold for relative poverty was 
set at the GNI per capital level of $250 in 1964 and was only adjusted for inflation, reaching 
$950 in 1987. However, as IDA resources were not adequate to permit funding all those 
countries below the threshold, a new operational cutoff was introduced in 1989. This threshold 
is adjusted annually, based on the availability of funds. In figure 1, we plot the operational 
threshold from 1989, the year in which it was formally introduced, until 2020 (the latest World 
Bank fiscal year). Even though it exhibits an increasing trend over time, as more funds become 
available, there is significant variability over time.  
[Insert Figure 1, Here] 
The rule of eligibility, however, is not deterministic. First, although data related to the 
relative poverty threshold are available from the World Bank’s annual reports, the conditions 
for the creditworthiness criterion are not disclosed. The World Bank does not provide a 
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specific formula for how countries are categorized as creditworthy, and those reports are kept 
confidential (Moss and Majerowicz 2012). For this, there may be cases below the threshold 
that do not receive IDA, as they are classified as creditworthy and receive IBRD funding. 
Second, IDA replenishment periods cover intervals of three years (World Bank 2010). This 
implies that for a country to become ineligible there must be a period of three successive years 
over which its GNI is above the operational threshold. Thus, a country might be above the 
threshold for up to two consecutive years and still receive IDA. The latter two groups of 
countries are considered to be blend countries, and might be eligible for IDA funding, but 
under tougher terms. Finally, over time there have been some exceptions to the GNI per capita 
operational eligibility cutoff for some small island economies, which are considered to be 
vulnerable, to be exposed to the hard terms of IBRD borrowing. 
Given the above considerations, to estimate the causal effect of international 
development assistance (IDA) on domestic conflict events, we use a fuzzy regression 
discontinuity design (Hahn et al. 2001) for a world sample over the 1989-2015 time period.11,12 
The regression discontinuity approach is ideal in our setting, as the operational cutoff of the 
World Bank is set before each fiscal year. Moreover, the operational threshold of the World 
Bank is arbitrarily set, without following a specific, predetermined policy rule.13 Furthermore, 
a fuzzy design is the correct approach as, following the discussion above, the treatment 
assignment is not a deterministic function of the running variable, i.e., the difference between 
GNI and the operational threshold of the World Bank. In other words, the randomness in the 
treatment assignment exists because there are countries below the threshold that do not receive 
IDA and countries above the threshold that do.  
In this setting, Fuzzy RDD exploits the discontinuities in the probability in the 
assignment of treatment: countries that have a GNI just below the operational threshold see a 
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jump in the probability of receiving IDA. Then, the discontinuity in the probability of 
treatment, when the GNI is below and above the operational threshold (i.e., the “running” 
variable), is an instrument for treatment status, and Fuzzy RDD uses a simple 2SLS estimation 
strategy (Hyytinen et al. 2018; Angrist and Pischke 2009).    
To determine whether a country receives IDA, we used the annual IDA reports of the 
World Bank.14 The same Bank reports give the operational threshold for each period.15 Our 
running variable is constructed as 𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡= 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑡−2 − 𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡−2. We use two lags 
because the World Bank gives IDA in fiscal year 𝑡 based on the GNI per capita on fiscal year 𝑡 − 2. Positive values of this variable imply eligibility for IDA at period 𝑡, and negative non-
eligibility. For the GNI, we use GNI per capita under the Atlas method, which is the exact 
variable used by the World Bank to determine the relative poverty criterion. As Atlas 
conversion rates are updated regularly, we use the variable as reported in the World 
Development Indicators annual publications for each respective year.16    
As RDDs are sensitive to the underlying functional form, we follow the standard 
practice (Becker et al. 2010; Potrafke and Rösel 2019) and estimate a local nonparametric 
model as in Calonico et al. (2014) and Calonico et al. (2018). Furthermore, as  Hyytinen et al. 
(2018) show, we report mainly the results of robust and bias-corrected RDD, as most of the 
time they report estimations closer to the true treatment effect. To derive the optimal 
bandwidths, we follow Calonico et al. (2014) and Calonico et al. (2018). Finally, following 
Lee and Lemieux (2010) we also report the results of a parametric RDD.  
The dependent variable is the various measures of conflict which are taken from the 
Banks and Wilson database (Banks and Wilson 2017). We examine the effect of IDA on all 
eight types of conflict that are reported in Banks and Wilson (2017)17. These events are: i) 
Peaceful public gatherings of at least 100 people for the primary purpose of displaying or 
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voicing their opposition to government policies or authority, Antigovernment Demonstrations; 
ii) Strikes of 1,000 or more industrial or service workers that involve more than one employer 
and that is aimed at national government policies, General Strikes; iii) Rapidly developing 
situations that threatens to bring the downfall of the present government, Government Crises; 
iv) Violent demonstrations or a clash of more than 100 citizens involving the use of physical 
force, Riots; v) Armed activities, sabotage or bombings carried out by independent bands of 
citizens or irregular forces and aimed at the overthrow of the government, Terrorism; vi) 
Systematic elimination by jailing or execution of political opposition within the ranks of the 
regime or the opposition, Purges; vii) Politically motivated murder or the attempted murder 
of a high government official or politician, Assassinations; vii) Illegal or forced changes in 
the top government elite, any attempt at such a change, or any successful or unsuccessful 
armed rebellion whose aim is independence from the central government, Revolutions. 
Finally, Banks and Wilson (2017) construct a weighted average of all eight categories and 
provide a general conflict index.18  
The conflict events reported in Banks and Wilson (2017) range from simple peaceful 
gatherings, i.e., Antigovernment Demonstrations, to major conflict events such as Revolutions 
and Political Assassinations. According to the above definitions we can conceive that 
Revolutions, Purges, and Assassinations are major conflict events within the country that aim 
at overthrowing the present political regime. In contrast, the rest of the conflict events 
documented are minor, low-level conflict events that simply express the grievance to the 
policies of the incumbent government. Hence, according to the discussion in the previous 
section, we should expect that if aid increases conflict events against the regime it should 
bring an increase to Revolutions, Purges, and Assassinations. In contrast, if the IDA results in 
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a “winning a hearts and minds” of the population, we should expect a positive treatment effect 
on the rest of the variables. 
To ensure that our model is correctly specified, we first examine whether there are 
discontinuities at the threshold in other variables, which might imply a confoundedness of the 
results, and we then include these variables as controls. The controls that we use are, namely: 
GDP per capita, as according to Collier (2000), in countries where higher income people have 
higher opportunity costs of participating in conflict activities. Following Collier (2000), the 
degree of diversity affects conflict as “the more social ties there are within a rebel 
organization, the easier it will be to build a fighting force.” Therefore, we use an index of 
ethnic, religious, and linguistic fractionalization. We also use the population growth since 
countries with a high population are harder for the government to control.19 We believe that 
the level of democracy might also affect conflict, since less democratic countries are more 
prone to experience higher levels of conflict (Hegre 2014). Finally, we use the total 
commitments of IDA (we have also experimented with the disbursements and the results 
remain the same).20  
5. Results 
To establish that the RDD is valid, we first provide a graphical representation of the jump of 
our measures of conflict at the threshold. Figures 2 to 10 show that there is a positive jump of 
Assassinations and Revolutions at the threshold. There are negative jumps of Antigovernment 
Demonstrations, Terrorism, Strikes, and Riots in the General Conflict Index. Furthermore, we 
find a small effect on Purges and Government Crises. According to these graphs, a significant 
change at the threshold might exist.  
[Insert Figures 2 to10, Here] 
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Panel A in Table 2 shows the baseline estimates of the Fuzzy RDD for the nine 
measures of conflict using three different measures of computing standard errors. We present 
estimations with conventional, robust, and bias corrected standard errors. Following Hyytinen 
et al. (2018) and Potrafke and Rösel (2019), even though we report the results for the 
conventional estimator, we only discuss the results of the robust and of the bias corrected 
estimator, which are typically considered the appropriate ones. In all columns we use 
covariates that affect domestic conflict and country and time fixed effects.21  
[Insert Table 2, Here] 
As we proceed from column (1) to column (9) we present the effect of IDA from minor 
to major conflict events. As the reader can easily verify, the effect of IDA on conflict is 
negative when we examine minor conflict events and positive when we examine major ones. 
The results in column (9) suggest that the overall conflict decreases when a country receives 
IDA. This result is statistically significant at the 1-percent level, when we use the bias 
corrected estimator, and at the 5-percent level when we use the robust estimator. The estimated 
treatment effect is quantitatively significant, as it is equal to a two standard-deviation change 
in the dependent variable.  
The results of the overall conflict index, however, do not give a clear picture of the 
effect of aid on conflict. As the rest of the columns in Table 2 show, there is a high degree of 
heterogeneity. The only variable that is statistically insignificant and can be considered as not 
affected by IDA is Government Crises. The results suggest that IDA leads to a decline in 
Antigovernment Demonstrations (column 1), General Strikes (column 2), Riots (column 4), 
Terrorism (column 5), and Purges (column 7).22 In contrast, we observe a positive effect of 
IDA on Assassinations (column 7) which is equivalent to a two standard-deviation increase 
and also in Revolutions (column 8) which is equivalent to a 1.5 standard-deviation increase.  
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Panel B reports the first-stage estimates. As the reader can easily verify, there is a 
positive relationship which implies that countries that cross the IDA threshold have a higher 
probability of receiving IDA, suggesting the validity of the instrument. 23,24 
Even though, at first sight, these results seem contradictive, there appears to be a clear 
pattern. First, minor conflict events like general strikes or peaceful demonstrations seem to 
decline after receiving IDA. In contrast, major events, especially those that might ultimately 
lead to a change in the political regime, like revolutions and purges of the opposition, appear 
to increase. So, it appears that there might be differences between conflict events directed 
against the political regime and events directed against the government. According to the 
results of the table, events that appear to have the aim of destabilizing the government (i.e., 
Antigovernment Demonstrations, General Strikes, and Riots) decline, while those that aim at 
changing the political regime increase (Purges, Assassinations, and Revolutions). These 
results, then, suggest that IDA “wins the hearts and minds” of the population, but at the same 
time gives incentives to politically powerful groups to engage in a power struggle to capture 
rents for themselves.  
[Insert Table 3, Here] 
As a test of the above conjecture, in Table 3 and Figure 11 we also employ a Fuzzy 
RDD, but our dependent variables are i) the number of coups (taken from Bjørnskov and Rode 
2019), and ii) the occurrence of an autocratic polity transition. According to the POLITY 
dataset, an autocratic polity transition occurs when there is at least a 3-point decline in the 20-
point polity scale.25 These results seem to confirm our explanation of our main findings. IDA 
appears to lead to an increased probability of a coup and to an increase in the probability of 
an autocratic transition.   
  
 
 
17 
 
6. Robustness 
We perform various alternative estimations in order to test the robustness of our 
results. In Table 4, Panel A, we present the same estimations as in Table 2, however, this time 
excluding the covariates. The results are similar to our baseline model. The only difference is 
that the effect on Antigovernment Demonstrations and General Strikes appears to become 
statistically insignificant. In Panel B, we perform the same estimates as in Panel A but we 
include country and time fixed effects in order to control for specific country and time 
characteristics.26 The signs and significance of the treatment effect for all conflict events 
remain the same as in our baseline specification, with the exception of Purges which loses 
statistical significance and now becomes only marginally statistically significant.  
[Insert Table 4, Here] 
In panels C and D we examine the robustness of our results on the selection of the 
bandwidth. Therefore, we impose two ad hoc bandwidths of (+/-700 dollars) and (+/- 1,000 
dollars) window, respectively, instead of relying on the optimal bandwidth selection. Overall, 
we find that the results remain similar to those in our baseline model. The General Conflict 
Index and the subindexes of Revolutions, Terrorism, and Assassinations are statistically 
significant when we use both the conventional and the bias-corrected estimator and their 
coefficients are similar to our baseline model. Strikes are not significant in Panel C however, 
they regain significance in Panel D. We should note that in most of the cases the variables 
lose significance, since restricting the window leads to a significant loss of observations.27  
In Panel E we exclude countries that receive other types of aid28. In this way we 
exclude the possibility that it is not IDA that drives our results, but other sources of foreign 
aid. According to Moss and Majerowicz (2012), sometimes other donors also adopt the IDA 
threshold crossing as a signal of the recipient’s need for economic assistance. Therefore, the 
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jumps observed might be influenced by the aid provided by these countries. For that reason, 
we drop these countries from the sample in order to ensure that it is the IDA and not any other 
types of aid that are driving the results. Overall, in this scenario we do not observe any 
significant change in the main in our results.  
In Panel F we perform a sharp regression discontinuity approach. The sharp regression 
discontinuity suggests a deterministic rule for IDA receipt (i.e., those cases that cross the IDA 
threshold will receive IDA). Even though the deterministic rule is not the appropriate 
modeling strategy in our case, it gives us insights on the validity of the Fuzzy RDD. 
Interestingly. all our main results remained unchanged.  
As we noted in the previous section, for a country to graduate from IDA, there must be a 
period of three successive years during which its GNI is above the operational threshold. This 
means that the World Bank will decide to cut IDA funds only in the subsequent (3-year) 
replenishment period. During the years 1987–2016 which is the period under examination, the 
World Bank had 10 replenishment periods. In Panel G we perform our baseline estimations, 
as in Table 2 using aggregate data across the (3-year) replenishment periods instead of annual 
observations for each country. Again, the overall index declines with IDA. We also find that 
the IDA has a negative effect on anti-government demonstrations when we use the robust and 
the bias-corrected estimator (column 2), as well as in Terrorism and General Strikes. 
Revolutions are statistically significant at the margin (a t-statistic of 1.57), while Riots and 
Assassinations lose some of their statistical significance, yet the general result of the previous 
tables still remains.  
[Insert Table 5 and 6, Here] 
Finally, in Table 5 and Table 6 we examine the robustness of our nonparametric Fuzzy 
RDD by performing parametric estimations. First, in Table 5 we estimate a global 2SLS model 
  
 
 
19 
 
using a sample of countries which are presented in the appendix.29 Panel A reports the second-
stage results while Panel B the first-stage results. Again, the results suggest that the overall 
Conflict Index decreases once a country receives IDA. Furthermore, Antigovernment 
Demonstrations, Riots, Revolutions, and Terrorism have the expected signs as before. 
However, we find no statistically significant effect on Purges, General Strikes, and 
Assassinations. Finally, in Table 6 we perform the same estimations as in Table 5 but we now 
use quadratic polynomial. The results are similar to those in Table 5.30  
7. Conclusions 
In this paper we tried to examine the causal effect of receiving international 
development assistance by the World Bank on domestic conflict events. We exploited the 
operational threshold used to assess the relative poverty criterion for Gross National Income, 
as set annually by the World Bank, in a Fuzzy RDD. According to our findings, the effect of 
IDA on conflict is not the same across various conflict types. Specifically, we found that IDA 
increases conflict events that aim at changing the political regime, whereas it has a negative 
effect on conflict events that simply express popular discontent.  
These results suggest that aid has a different effect depending on the intensity of 
conflict event. In this way, individuals that hold political power within the country may loot 
the aid revenues, despite the fact that the government has won the political support of the 
population. Our argument is supported by additional Fuzzy RDD estimations in which we find 
that IDA increases coups as well as leading to autocratic regime change. Our results are robust 
across alternative specifications.  
These results are significant from a policy perspective as they allow us to understand 
the changes in the political arena within the country, due to the development policies. Even 
though these policies might be quite effective, and may yield a positive short-run effect in 
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terms of improving both economic and political conditions, in the long run they might well be 
quite detrimental. By creating rents within the economy, they might spur a process of internal 
conflicts with the aim of creating an extractive and authoritarian regime. And, ultimately, 
unless foreign aid conditions are properly structured, this long-run effect might be adverse 
enough to nullify all the positive short-run effects of aid on the economy.  
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Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 1: Operational Threshold of IDA.  
source: The World Bank Operational Manual : Operational Directive OD3.10 - IBRD/IDA Countries : Per Capita Incomes, Lending Eligibility, and 
Repayment Terms 
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Table 1:Data and definitions 
 
 
 
 
Variable Mean St. Dev Min Max Source Definition 
Anti-government demonstrations 0.908132 4.116154 0 149 Banks and Wilson (2017) Peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people for the primary purpose of displaying or 
voicing their opposition to government policies or authority. 
Strikes 
0.1281048 0.6232052 0 13 
Banks and Wilson (2016) Strikes of 1,000 or more industrial or service workers that involve more than one employer 
and that is aimed at national government policies,  
Government crises 
0.1252127 0.3925986 0 5 
Banks and Wilson (2016) Rapidly developing situation that threatens to bring the downfall of the present government  
Riots 
0.4535556 1.716747 0 28 
Banks and Wilson (2016) Violent demonstrations or clash of more than 100 citizens involving the use of physical force   
Terrorism 
0.6361007 7.678771 0 363 
Banks and Wilson (2016) Armed activities, sabotage or bombings carried out by independent bands of citizens or irregular forces and aimed at the overthrow of the government.  
Purges 
0.0416808 0.268849 0 5 
Banks and Wilson (2016) Systematic elimination by jailing or execution of political opposition within the ranks of the 
regime or the opposition 
Assassinations 
0.1609391 0.8411073 0 26 
Banks and Wilson (2016) Politically motivated murder or attempted murder of a high government official or politician.  
Revolutions 
0.1480095 0.4661836 0 9 
Banks and Wilson (2016) 
Illegal or forced changes in the top government elite, any attempt at such a change, or any 
successful or unsuccessful armed rebellion whose aim is independence from the central 
government.  
General conflict index 
 
1448.598 
 
9895.669 
 
0 
 
455500 
 
Banks and Wilson (2016) 
 
Weighted average of all 8 categories  
 
    
  
Coups  0.0005077 0.0225284 0 1 Bjornskov and Rhode Takes value 1 if a coup occurred and zero otherwise 
IDA threshold     World Bank reports  
Receipt of IDA 
0.2716489 0.4448475 0 1 
World Bank reports Takes value 1 if a country receives IDA 
GNI per capita 8466.696 14674.59 60 203900 World Bank reports  
Regime transition 
-1.66595 15.82064 -2 +3 
Polity IV Project Negative values denote an autocratic regime transition while positive a democratic one 
GDP per capita 13093.94 15887.26 134 156144 Maddison Gross Domestic Product per capita 
Population growth 1.59 1.48 -6.184 16.33 World Bank  
Oil rents 3.672296 9.35293 0 64.013 World Bank Oil Rents 
Fractionalization  0.4391768 
 
0.1853397 
 
0.0068726 
 
0.8176585 Alesina Mean of ethnic, religious, and language fractionalization (own calculations) 
Commitments of aid 
1.766042 5.559134 0 24.8664 OECD 
 
Total commitments of aid (all donors). 
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Table 2: Baseline Results 
 
Note: Local polynomial regression discontinuity (RD) estimates running the optimal bandwidth procedure are reported (Calonico et al. 2014, 2018). Yearly observations and three different 
methods in computing standard errors apply to both panels. In Panel A, we present the second-stage results and in Panel B, the first-stage results. Covariates that are used are: population 
growth, GDP per capita, fractionalization, democracy index, oil rents, and total commitments of aid. Significance levels (t statistics in parentheses):+0.001, ***0.01, **0.05, *0.1. N left-
N Right gives the number of observations to the left and to the right of the optimally chosen bandwidth (Calonico et al. 2014, 2018).  
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
Panel A: 
Second Stage 
Anti-
Government 
Demonstrations 
General Strikes Government 
Crises 
Riots Terrorism Purges Assassinations Revolutions Weighted 
Conflict Index 
         
Conventional -4.512 -0.355 0.250 -0.698 -5.016 0.163* 1.327* 0.492 -5852.6 
 (-1.46) (-1.52) (1.23) (-0.95) (-1.56) (1.66) (1.83) (1.05) (-1.49) 
          
Bias-corrected -6.670** -1.029+ 0.0107 -1.935*** -8.135** 0.374+ 1.975*** 0.943** -10137.8*** 
 (-2.16) (-4.39) (0.05) (-2.62) (-2.53) (3.81) (2.73) (2.01) (-2.58) 
          
Robust -6.670* -1.029+ 0.0107 -1.935** -8.135** 0.374*** 1.975** 0.943* -10137.8** 
 (-1.77) (-4.01) (0.04) (-2.29) (-2.17) (2.86) (2.29) (1.67) (-2.18) 
Panel B: First stage results 
Conventional 0.145*** 0.300+ 0.230+ 0.254+ 0.240+ 0.258+ 0.160** 0.194+ 0.255+ 
 (2.58) (6.77) (4.66) (5.38) (4.95) (5.52) (2.50) (3.72) (5.45) 
Bias-corrected 0.700 0.187+ 0.122** 0.153+ 0.156+ 0.166*** 0.09* 0.118** 0.155+ 
 (1.23) (4.35) (2.47) (3.26) (3.22) (2.85) (1.65) (2.25) (3.30) 
Robust 0.700 0.187+ 0.122* 0.153** 0.156** 0.166** 0.09 0.118* 0.155*** 
 (1.03) (3.30) (1.92) (2.54) (2.61) (2.81) (1.39) (1.88) (2.58) 
Polynomial 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Obs (total) 3671   3671 3671 3671 3671 3671 3671 3671 3671 
N left- N right  570-1265 811-1265 608-1265  692-1265 727-1265 746-1265  616-1265 662-1265 694-1265 
Bwidth_Left 692.6 1411.3 957.5 1083.2 1004.4 1112.4 732.6 837.7 1095.6 
Bwidth_Right 692.6 1411.3 957.5 1083.2 1004.4 1112.4 732.6 837.7 1095.6 
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed and Time Effects No No No No No No No No No 
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Table 3: Additional Fuzzy RDD estimations 
Figure 11 
Note: Local polynomial regression discontinuity (RD) estimates running the optimal 
bandwidth procedure are reported (Calonico et al. 2014, 2018). (t statistics in 
parentheses):+0.001, ***0.01, **0.05, *0.1. 
 (1) (2) 
 Regime Transition Coups 
Conventional -0.26 0.0255 
 (-1.09) (1.50) 
   
Bias-corrected -0.76*** 0.0404** 
 (-3.20) (2.38) 
   
Robust -0.76** 0.0404 
 (-2.68) (1.51) 
Polynomial 1 1 
Obs 3639 4550 
Bandwidth 1276.550 1680.323 
  
 
 
33 
 
Table 4: Robustness 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Anti-Government 
Demonstrations 
General Strikes Government Crises Riots Terrorism Purges Assassinations Revolutions Weighted Conflict Index 
Panel A: No covariates 
Conventional -0.0995 -0.649 0.0768 -1.043 -4.472* 0.117 1.174 0.554 -10008.8 
 (-0.01) (-0.66) (0.40) (-0.99) (-1.79) (0.83) (1.50) (1.42) (-1.40) 
          
Bias-corrected 4.998 -1.192 -0.241 -2.284** -7.674*** 0.290** 1.858** 0.867** -16520.1** 
 (0.47) (-1.22) (-1.25) (-2.16) (-3.07) (2.05) (2.37) (2.22) (-2.32) 
          
Robust 4.998 -1.192 -0.241 -2.284* -7.674** 0.290* 1.858** 0.867* -16520.1* 
 (0.38) (-1.02) (-0.97) (-1.78) (-2.46) (1.75) (1.96) (1.76) (-1.96) 
Covariates No No No No No No No No No 
Country & Time  
Fixed Effects 
No No No No No No No No No 
Observations (total) 4566 4566 4566 4566 4566 4566 4566 4566 4566 
Nleft, Nright 
 
410 858 
548.39 
455 1055 
626.661 
653 1445 
1026.636 
615 1425 
935.443 
858 1445 
1026.636 
626 1431 
1373.37 
519 1305 
752.708 
628 1334 
1263.979 
570 1406 
864.439 
Panel B: Country & Time Fixed Effects 
Conventional -3.065 -0.334 -0.316 -1.038 -4.528 0.0840 0.485 0.626** -4959.4 
 (-1.12) (-1.51) (-1.01) (-1.47) (-1.35) (0.71) (1.01) (2.02) (-1.31) 
          
Bias-corrected -2.491 -0.577*** -0.660** -1.771** -7.265** 0.200* 0.988** 0.912*** -7907.0** 
 (-0.91) (-2.62) (-2.12) (-2.52) (-2.17) (1.69) (2.06) (2.94) (-2.09) 
          
Robust -2.491 -0.577** -0.660* -1.771** -7.265* 0.200 0.988* 0.912** -7907.0* 
 (-0.75) (-2.25) (-1.75) (-1.97) (-1.81) (1.40) (1.67) (2.31) (-1.72) 
Covariates No No No No No No No No No 
          
Country & Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations (total) 4540 4540 4540 4540 4540 4540 4540 4540 4540 
N left, N right 
Bandwidth 
523 1319 
762.499 
713 1444 
1154.519 
525 1332 
766.991 
730 1444 
1165.978 
615 1424 
937.134 
712 1444 
1139.534 
534 1357 
790.203 
620 1428 
951.31 
677 1444 
1070.319 
Panel C: Window +-700 
Conventional -4.521 -0.577 0.192 -1.849 -8.506 0.369* 1.453* 0.750 -10395.1 
 (-1.50) (-1.29) (0.55) (-1.30) (-1.40) (1.73) (1.78) (1.06) (-1.33) 
          
Bias-corrected -3.479 -0.539 0.0794 -4.173*** -12.83** 0.701*** 3.084+ 1.323* -15340.4* 
 (-1.15) (-1.20) (0.23) (-2.94) (-2.12) (3.29) (3.77) (1.87) (-1.96) 
          
Robust -3.479 -0.539 0.0794 -4.173** -12.83 0.701** 3.084*** 1.323 -15340.4 
 (-0.76) (-0.86) (0.16) (-2.22) (-1.57) (2.55) (2.89) (1.30) (-1.46) 
Observations (total) 3671 3671 3671 3671 3671 3671 3671 3671 3671 
Nleft, Nright 
Bandwidth 
435 1219 
837.654 
616 1265 
1341.483 
562 1265 
1171.420 
592 1265 
1274.868 
585 1265 
1235.966 
501 1265 
1018.701 
550 1265 
1151.894 
373 969 
660.599 
639 1265 
1396.948 
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country & Time Fixed Effects No No No No No No No No No 
Observations (total) 3671 3671 3671 3671 3671 3671 3671 3671 3671 
N left N right 
 
 
391 1048 391 1048 391 1048 391 1048 391 1048 391 1048 391 1048 391 1048 391 1048 
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Note: Local polynomial regression discontinuity (RD) estimates running the optimal bandwidth procedure are reported (Calonico et al.,2014, 2018). See also the notes in Table 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4:continued 
         
Panel D: Window +- 1000 
Conventional -4.074** -0.442 0.260 -0.829 -5.035 0.190* 0.703* 0.363 -6390.7 
 (-2.03) (-1.63) (1.35) (-1.06) (-1.56) (1.78) (1.73) (1.06) (-1.49) 
Bias-corrected -4.979** -0.723*** 0.117 -2.366*** -9.252*** 0.409+ 1.538+ 0.781** -11574.4*** 
 (-2.48) (-2.67) (0.60) (-3.02) (-2.86) (3.83) (3.78) (2.27) (-2.70) 
Robust -4.979** -0.723** 0.117 -2.366** -9.252** 0.409*** 1.538+ 0.781 -11574.4** 
 (-2.09) (-2.14) (0.43) (-2.39) (-2.33) (3.23) (3.33) (1.56) (-2.20) 
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country & Time Fixed 
Effects 
No No No No No No No No No 
Οbservations (total) 3671 3671 3671 3671 3671 3671 3671 3671 3671 
N left N right 493 1260 493 1260 493 1260 493 1260 493 1260 493 1260 493 1260 493 1260 493 1260 
Panel E: Without Covariates that receive other types of aid 
 
Conventional -4.535** -0.308 0.321* -0.476 -5.157 0.144 0.856* 0.385 -6048.0 
 (-2.06) (-1.32) (1.92) (-0.69) (-1.62) (1.40) (1.78) (1.20) (-1.53) 
          
Bias-corrected -6.908*** -0.974+ 0.105 -1.646** -8.470*** 0.374+ 1.380*** 0.751** -10533.6*** 
 (-3.14) (-4.18) (0.63) (-2.38) (-2.66) (3.64) (2.88) (2.33) (-2.67) 
          
Robust -6.908*** -0.974+ 0.105 -1.646** -8.470** 0.374*** 1.380** 0.751* -10533.6** 
 (-2.93) (-3.84) (0.51) (-2.02) (-2.20) (2.63) (2.34) (1.75) (-2.17) 
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country & Time Fixed 
Effects 
No No No No No No No No No 
Οbservations (total) 3366 3366 3366 3366 3366 3366 3366 3366 3366 
N left N right 
Bandwidth 
423 1131 
909.654 
635 1152 
1664.423 
458 1182 
1111.661 
549 1152 
1324.448 
488 1152 
1110.406 
527 1152 
1225.495 
431 1131 
925.772 
498 1152 
1154.834 
521 1152 
1211.919 
Panel F: Sharp RDD 
Conventional -1.030* -0.101 0.0755* -0.147 -0.934 0.0353 0.181* 0.0852 -1151.8 
 (-1.96) (-1.49) (1.77) (-0.79) (-1.44) (1.43) (1.90) (1.22) (-1.31) 
Bias-corrected -1.181** -0.233+ -0.00339 -0.422** -1.427** 0.0789*** 0.236** 0.145** -1816.4** 
 (-2.25) (-3.44) (-0.08) (-2.28) (-2.20) (3.20) (2.47) (2.08) (-2.06) 
Robust -1.181*** -0.233*** -0.00339 -0.422** -1.427* 0.0789** 0.236** 0.145 -1816.4 
 (-2.60) (-3.29) (-0.06) (-1.97) (-1.72) (2.45) (2.06) (1.45) (-1.63) 
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country & Time Fixed 
Effects 
No No No No No No No No No 
Observations (total) 3366 3366 3366 3366 3366 3366 3366 3366 3366 
N left N right 
Bandwidth 
595 1265 
1282.389 
659 1265 
1463.884 
535 1265 
1103.472 
584 1265 
1232.246 
723 1265 
1710.466 
621 1265 
1350.428 
545 1265 
1119.827 
660 1265 
1465.006 
458 1152 
1154.834 
Panel G: Replenishment Periods 
Conventional -5.098 -0.451 0.101 0.0867 -2.705 -0.00920 0.0970 0.498 -6195.7 
 (-1.49) (-1.13) (0.21) (0.08) (-0.98) (-0.04) (0.20) (0.90) (-1.27) 
Bias-corrected -7.629** -1.081*** -0.170 -1.176 -6.064** 0.280 0.303 0.867 -12346.1** 
 (-2.23) (-2.70) (-0.36) (-1.13) (-2.20) (1.13) (0.61) (1.57) (-2.54) 
Robust -7.629** -1.081** -0.170 -1.176 -6.064 0.280 0.303 0.867 -12346.1* 
 (-2.12) (-2.43) (-0.30) (-0.97) (-1.59) (0.90) (0.45) (1.15) (-1.85) 
Covariates No No No No No No No No No 
Country & Period Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations (total) 1596 1596 1596 1596 1596 1596 1596 1596 1596 
N left-N right 
Bandwidth 
223-499 
904.453 
321-507 
1433.478 
264-507 
1129.564 
341-507 
1565.842 
306-507 
1362.378 
323-507 
1457.452 
261-507 
1119.158 
266-507 
 
306-507 
1596 
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Table 5: Global Regression Discontinuity Model 
 
 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
Panel A: 
Second Stage 
Anti-
Government 
Demonstrations 
General 
Strikes 
Government 
Crises 
Riots Terrorism Purges Assassinations Revolutions Weighted 
Conflict Index 
         
Treatment Effect -6.454** -0.345 -0.072 -1.699** -6.409** 0.022 0.224 0.345** -8697.877** 
 (-2.167) (-1.215) (-0.561) (-2.231) (-2.131) (0.242) (0.976) (2.312) (-2.204) 
Forcing  -0.001*** -0.000** -0.001*** -0.001* 0.000*** 0.001*** -0.000** -0.001*** 0.033* 
 (-2.710) (-2.422) (-2.914) (-1.679) (2.863) (4.302) (-2.009) (-5.554) (1.826) 
Observations 4537 4537 4537 4537 4537 4537 4537 4537 4537 
r2 -0.0624 0.00823 0.0179 0.0623 -0.0216 0.0512 0.0173 -0.0139 -0.0187 
F 4.383 4.094 2.994 7.467 1.312 4.135 3.448 6.555 2.269 
First stage results:  
 
1 if eligible 0.200*** 
   (6.906) 
Forcing -0.001** 
 (-2.202) 
First stage F 
47.67 
Note: Global polynomial regression discontinuity (RD) estimates using time and country fixed effects. Significance levels (t statistics in parentheses): ***0.01, **0.05, *0.10. 
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Table 6: Global Regression Discontinuity Model-Polynomial 2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Anti-Government 
Demonstrations 
General Strikes Government 
Crises 
Riots Terrorism Purges Assassinations Revolutions Weighted 
Conflict 
Index 
          
IDA recipient -6.548** -0.356 -0.074 -1.733** -6.400** 0.022 0.226 0.340** -8720.045** 
 (-2.194) (-1.251) (-0.575) (-2.268) (-2.126) (0.240) (0.977) (2.271) (-2.207) 
forcing -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000*** 0.000* 0.000** -0.000 -0.000*** 0.022 
 (-4.141) (-2.880) (-2.323) (-3.171) (1.923) (2.203) (-0.806) (-4.553) (0.705) 
Forcing x 
forcing 
-0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 
 (-3.997) (-2.748) (-1.235) (-3.366) (0.412) (-0.040) (0.483) (-2.991) (-0.674) 
Observations 4537 4537 4537 4537 4537 4537 4537 4537 4537 
r2 -0.0656 0.00789 0.0178 0.0610 -0.0214 0.0512 0.0172 -0.0115 -0.0190 
F 4.523 3.995 2.888 7.171 1.282 3.998 3.346 6.348 2.224 
First Stage Results 
1 if eligible           0.200*** 
         (6.873) 
Forcing             -0.001*** 
          (-2.849) 
Forcing squared -0.001*** 
                      (-2.713) 
           
    First stage F 
47.21 
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APPENDIX 
Table A 1 
t statistics in parentheses * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, + p<0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Population growth  Oil rents  Real GDP per 
Capita 
Fractionalization Level of 
Democracy  
Commitments 
Conventional -2.839 0.730 -1087.6 -0.0364 0.214 10.42** 
 (-1.08) (0.20) (-0.72) (-0.35) (0.08) (2.36) 
       
Bias-corrected -4.077 -3.160 -719.9 0.0320 3.284 16.97+ 
 (-1.55) (-0.85) (-0.48) (0.31) (1.17) (3.84) 
       
Robust -4.077 -3.160 -719.9 0.0320 3.284 16.97*** 
 (-1.35) (-0.69) (-0.42) (0.25) (1.02) (3.04) 
Polynomial 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Obs 4507 4370 3959 4410 3959 4566 
N_total_left 3067 2960 2634 3024 2562 3121 
N_total_right 1440 1410 1325 1386 1397 1445 
N_left 703 877 774 917 744 858 
N_right 1440 1410 1325 1386 1397 1445 
Bwidth_Left 600.5 1110.7 872.5 966.6 699.1 857.8 
Bwidth_Right 600.5 1110.7 872.5 966.6 699.1 857.8 
Bandwidth mserd mserd mserd mserd mserd mserd 
Covariates       
Kernel Triangular Triangular Triangular Triangular Triangular Triangular 
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Figure A 1      Figure A 2      Figure A 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A 4      Figure A 5      Figure A 6 
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Table A 2: Country List 
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 Notes: 
 
1
 We use a Fuzzy RDD since a simple OLS regression one would create several biases. First, reverse causality might 
be a problem as countries with high levels of conflict may also receive aid for conflict reduction. Second, aid 
recipient countries are less developed, and lower development is associated with higher incidence of conflict 
(Humphreys 2003).   
2
 Using the Banks and Wilson (2017) database, we examine various types of conflict events, specifically, riots, anti-
government demonstrations, strikes and government crises, revolutions, purges, terrorist attacks, and assassinations. 
Following the logic of Banks and Wilson (2017), we separate into these two categories, major and minor conflict 
events, based on the dataset’s codebook https://www.cntsdata.com/domconflict/c1svs.  
3
 In the same paper it is argued that even humanitarian aid can have adverse effects by creating shelters for 
combatants. Similarly, Anderson (1999), Cooley and Ron (2002), and de Waal (2014) argue that refugee camps can 
help extremists and potential rebels by providing them with camouflage or serving as a point of recruitment. Wood 
and Molfino (2016) find that humanitarian aid leads to increased violence between government and rebels by 
performing a difference-in-differences estimation for 20 African countries. Their argument is that large amounts of 
aid create incentives for rebels to extend their control over larger areas. However, they find that other types of aid 
have no effect on conflict. 
4
 The term "winning the hearts and minds" means that someone tries to bring a subjugated population over to their 
side by making emotional appeals to the supporters of the other side and was first used by Louis Hubert Gonzalve 
Lyautey, a French general and colonial administrator, as part of his strategy to counter the Black Flags rebellion 
along the Indochina-Chinese border in 1895 (Paret et al. 1986). 
5
 Conditional cash transfer programs are those types of financial aid that aim to reduce poverty and individuals who 
are potential recipients of those programs must meet with some criteria.  
6
 Against this view, Bradbury (2010), in a study for Kenya, argues that foreign aid does not win the “hearts and 
minds” of the population as they find that the level of security decreases three years after the receipt of aid. Since 
many people are skeptical regarding the presence of CJTF-HOA6 this would probably attract extremist violence.  
7
 Similarly(Ashley Jackson and Antonio Giustozzi 2012) in their report for Afghanistan, argue that aid resulted in 
higher conflict because the Taliban could not use humanitarian aid to their advantage. 
8
 Several other arguments are proposed for why aid may reduce conflict. First, with aid revenues there is an increase 
in military expenditures, which makes a possible revolution less likely to occur (Collier and Hoeffler, 2007; (de Ree 
and Nillesen 2009)). Second, there is less dependence on primary commodity exports (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002). 
Last, the positive impact on growth makes a revolution more costly, by increasing the opportunity costs of conflict 
and the opportunity costs of recruiting rebels (Crost et al. 2016). However, all these arguments are, at least indirectly, 
related to the ones presented in the main text. 
9
 Koubi and Böhmelt (2013), argue that armed conflicts in Nepal, Indonesia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone provide 
anecdotal evidence of cases where asymmetry in wealth distribution led to civil war  
10 As of July 2019, the interest rate was set at 1.46% for credits in USD. The maturity period was set at 40 years 
for small economies, 38 years for regular IDA countries, and 30 years for blend economies, i.e., creditworthy 
economies which are below the operational GNI cutoff, or standard IDA countries with a GNI above the operational 
cutoff for 2 consecutive years. Finally, the grace period was set at 10, 6 and 5 years for each of the 3 groups of 
eligible countries, respectively. See http://ida.worldbank.org/financing/ida-lending-terms for more details. 
11
 For a general discussion of the regression discontinuity approach, see Lee and Lemieux (2010). 
12
 For the list of countries see the Appendix Table A2. Since the panel is unbalanced, the number of countries that 
we use in each year may differ due to missing values. 
13
 Galiani et al. (2017) have tested the possibility of manipulating the IDA threshold. They performed a density test 
in order to test whether a brunching exists. Their argument is that if countries could manipulate the threshold, there 
would have been a significant brunching of observations just below the threshold, relative to those observations just 
above it. What they found was that, indeed, there was no evidence of brunching or thus threshold manipulation. 
14
 These reports were provided directly to us and to date they are not available online. 
15
 Galiani et al. (2017) also use the same reports for a more limited time period. For overlapping observations in our 
sample and the latter sample we confirmed that they are the same.  
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16
 RDD is sensitive to the measurement of the running variable, so we used the exact same variable that determines 
the rule. The annual publication of the World Development Indicators is available at 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/2124. 
17
 We examine the effect of IDA given at time t-1 on conflict at t. We have also experimented with the effect of IDA 
at time t and t-2 on conflict at t. All the results remain the same as the ones presented here. 
18
 As the weights changed after 2007, for consistency, we have computed the variable after 2007 with the same 
weights as in pre-2007.  
19
 Moreover, the literature that examines the effect of the youth bulge on conflict (Huntington 2011), typically uses 
the population growth rate as a proxy for the growing share of the young age population. We also experimented 
with the share of young population (aged 15–24) as a dependent variable and our results remain qualitatively 
unchanged.  
20
 Table 1 gives descriptive statistics and data sources for all variables. 
21
 A crucial assumption in RD approaches is that there are no discontinuities in other covariates across the 
threshold. Since those variables, according to the literature, affect conflict, we have also performed fuzzy 
regression discontinuity designs to examine whether they jump at the threshold. This means that the only variables 
that change discontinuously at the threshold are just the conflict measures and no other variables that affect 
conflict. In the appendix we present the estimations and the figures of these specifications (Table A 1,Figures A1-
A6). 
22
 These results are quantitatively significant. The treatment effect on Antigovernment demonstrations is equivalent 
to a 1.5 standard-deviation decrease. Similarly, the corresponding magnitudes are approximately 1.12 1.5, 1.1 and 
2 standard deviations for the riots, purges, guerilla warfare and strikes, respectively. 
23
 We should note that a simple correlation shows that approximately 60% of the cases that cross the GNI threshold 
receive IDA, which further indicates the validity of the instrument.   
24
 Note that first-stage estimates differ across columns because the optimal bandwidth in each estimation differs. 
The first stage results for the robustness checks are not reported due to space considerations and are available upon 
request. The first stage results are the same across only columns that use the same bandwidth, e.g., Panels C and D 
of Table 4 and Table 6.  
25
 Since coups is a binary variable with many zero values, the RDD graph has little meaning. 
26
 Since the Calonico and Cattaneo (2014) procedures do not allow for country and time fixed effects, we have 
double de-meaned the dependent variables. 
27
 Jacob et al. (2012) suggest that there is a tradeoff between bias and precision. Using a large window, we get more 
precise estimates, since more data points are used.  
28
 I.e., countries that receive aid both from IDA and other donor countries/institutions. 
29
 As already noted, bandwidth selection implies a tradeoff between precision and bias (Jacob et al. 2012). Thus, we 
use all the observations in order to estimate the causal effect of IDA on conflict. 
30
 We have also estimated a global parametric RDD, which is restricted in the window of +/-1000 USD and +/-700 
USD. The results are the same as the ones presented here and are available upon request. 
